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注释： ①分别发生于1819年、1825年、1837年、1846年。对于危机的次数，学者们的观点不尽相同，有些人认为多于四次。参见Norman J.Silbering,"British Prices and Business Cycles,1779-1850," The Review of Economics and Statistics,vol.5,Supplement 2(Oct.1923),p.229; William Beveridge,"The Trade Cycle in Britain before 1850," Oxford Economic Papers,no.3(Feb.1940),pp.78-79; N.F.R.Crafts,S.J.Leybourne and T.C.Mills,"Trends and Cycles in Britistl Industrial Production,1700-1913," Journal of the Royal Staristical Society,series A(Statistics in Society),vol.152,no.1,1989,pp.43-60. ②约翰·詹姆斯在最近的研究中甚至称之为“19世纪前半期最严重的一次”。参见John A.James,"Panics,Payments Disruptions and the Bank of England Before 1826," Financal History Review,vol.19,no.3(Dec.2012),p.295. ③19世纪人们并不常用“危机”(crisis)来谈论这类经济事件，多使用如“恐慌”(panic)、“困境”(distress)、“动荡”(convulsion)、“恶化”(revulsion)等词语。参见Daniele Besomi,"The Periodicity of Crises:A Survey of the Literature Before 1850," Journal of the History of Economic Thought,vol.32,no.1,2010,pp.88-90. ④Larry Neal,"The Financial Crisis of 1825 and the Restructuring of the British Financial System," Review,Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis,May/June 1998,pp.69-74. ⑤Giorgio Fodor,"The Boom that Never was? Latin American Loans in London 1822-1825," Paper presented at the Conference "Crisis:From the Real Economy to the Financial System," Venice,17-18 Nov.2000,pp.31-32. ⑥Frank Griffith Dawson,The First Latin American Debt Crisis:The City of London and the 1822-25 Loan Bubble,New Haven and London:Yale University Press,1990,p.124. ⑦Marc Flandreau and Juan H.Flores,"Bonds and Brands:Foundations of Sovereign Debt Markets,1820-1830," The Journal of Economic History,vol.69,no.3(Sep.2009),pp.658-659. ⑧John Clapham,The Bank of England:A History,vol.II,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1958,pp.102-103. ⑨Larry Neal,"The Financial Crisis of 1825 and the Restructuring of the British Financial System," p.72. ⑩Roderick Floud and Paul Johnson,eds.,The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain,vol.I,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,2006,p.161. (11)Lucy Newton and P.L.Cottrell,"Joint-Stock Banking in the English Provinces 1826-1857:To Branch or Not to Branch?" Business and Economic History,vol.27,no.1(Fall 1998),p.116; Lucy Newton,"The Birth of Join-Stock Banking:England and New England Compared," The Business History Review,vol.84,no.1(Spring 2010),pp.31,46. (12)在英国学界，对18-19世纪英国经济增长率具体数值的估算观点不一。迪恩和科尔对增长率的估计比较高，克拉夫茨、哈雷等学者则认为应该明显低得多。本文参考的是克拉夫茨较近的成果。有关研究可参见Phyllis Deane and W.A.Cole,British Economic Growth 1688-1959,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1969,pp.280,283; C.Knick Harley,"British Industrialization before 1841:Evidence of Slower Growth During the Industrial Revolution," The Journal of Economic History,vol.42,no.2(Jun.1982),pp.267-289; N.F.R.Crafts,British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1985,p.45; N.F.R.Crafts and C.K.Harley,"Output Growth and the British Industrial Revolution:A Restatement of the Crafts-Harley Review," The Economic History Review,New Series,vol.45,no.4(Nov.1992),p.715. (13)Thomas Tooke,A History of Prices and of the State of Circulation,vol.II,London:Longman,Orme,Brown,Green and Longman,1838,p.148. (14)B.R.Mitchell,ed.,British Historical Statistics,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press,1988,pp.332,356. (15)Henry English,A Complete View of the Joint Stock Companies Formed during the Years 1824 and 1825,London:Boosey and Sons,1827,pp.29-31. (16)J.Fred Rippy,"Latin America and the British Investment 'Boom' of the 1820's," The Journal of Modern History,vol.19,no.2(Jun.1947),pp.123-124. (17)Thomas Tooke,A History of Prices,vol.II,p.152. (18)The Morning Post,Monday,January 24,1825. (19)The Parliamentary Debates,new series,vol.XII,London:T.C.Hansard,1825,p.717. (20)Berrow's Worcester Journal,Thursday,September 1,1825. (21)The Morning Post,Monday,October 03,1825. (22)The Morning Post,Monday,October 17,1825. (23)Jackson's Oxford Journal,Saturday,October 29,1825. (24)The Lancaster Gazette,Saturday,November 05,1825. (25)对于棉纺织业所占工业比重仍存在争论。克拉夫茨认为，1801年英国棉工业附加值占国内全部工业的17％，1831年达到22.4％。艾斯塔班则认为1801年已占28％，1831年为31.3％。但哈雷和克拉夫茨则认为，艾斯塔班的“估计是严重夸大的”。本文综合参考了两派学者的结论，参见N.F.R.Crafts,British Economic Growth during the Industrial Revolution,pp.17,22; Javier Cuenca Esteban,"British Textile Prices,1770-1831:Are British Growth Rates Worth Revising Once Again?" The Economic History Review,New Series,vol.47,no.1(Feb.1994),p.86; C.K.Harley and N.F.R.Crarts,"Cotton Textiles and Industrial Output Growth during the Industrial Revolution," The Economic History Review,New Series,vol.48,no.1(Feb.1995),p.141. (26)The Morning Chronicle,Tuesday,December 13,1825. (27)The Examiner,Sunday,December 18,1825. (28)Jackson's Oxford Journal,Saturday,February 18,1826. (29)Frank Griffith Dawson,The First Latin American Debt Crisis:The City of London and the 1822-25 Loan Bubble,p.71. (30)The Morning Post,Thursday,February 16,1826. (31)The Morning Post,Wednesday,December 31,1825; The Morning Post,Monday,January 02,1826; The Morning Post,Tuesday,January 03,1826. (32)Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the Bank of England Charter,London:James & Luke G.Hansard & Sons,1832,Appendix 101. (33)英格兰银行此时既不是中央银行，更不是国有银行。它是一家拥有参股垄断权的股份银行公司，资本由私人认股投资而成，由董事会决策。换而言之，它是英格兰唯一一家股份制商业银行。但该行与政府关系密切，自其1694年建立之日起就承担为政府管理国债和提供贷款的业务。英格兰银行特权的有效期由议会授权，一般为21年，到期后须经议会批准方可延期。 (34)Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the Bank of England Charter,1832,p.400; Court of Directors Minutes,1825-26,Bank of England Archive,G4/48,p.150. (35)The Examiner,Sunday,January 1,1826. (36)The Morning Chronicle,Wednesday,December 14,1825; The Examiner,Sunday,December 18,1825. (37)The Liverpool Mercury,Friday,December 23,1825. (38)当时人们将贵金属货币视为真正意义上的现金。钞票(或称纸币、银行券)只是一种纸面信用工具，发行者有义务将其兑换为等额的贵金属货币。 (39)John Clapham,The Bank of England:A History,vol.Ⅱ,p.99.另注：理论上，英格兰银行是按黄金储备发行钞票，负有随时兑换黄金的义务。金融家罗斯柴尔德(Rothschild)曾在议会作证时说，任何人向英格兰银行兑换黄金，银行都会支付，而不问其用途。参见Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the Bank of England Charter,1832,p.385. (40)Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the Bank of England Charter,1832,Appendix 55. (41)Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the Bank of England Charter,1832,pp.153,154,151. (42)Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the Bank of England Charter,1832,pp.404,154. (43)The Morning Post,Monday,December 19,1825. (44)John Clapham,The Bank of England:A History,vol.II,p.99. (45)Report from the Committee of Secrecy on the Bank of England Charter,1832,Appendix 55. (46)The Parliamentary Debates,new series,vol.XIV,London:T.C.Hansard,1826,p.1. (47)Court of Directors Minutes,1825-26,Bank of England Archive,G4/48,pp.247-248. (48)Court of Directors Minutes,1825-26,Bank of England Archive,G4/48,pp.244,248. (49)The Parliamentary Debates,new series,vol.XIV,p.481. (50)Journals of the House of Commons,vol.81,1826,pp.81-82. (51)Journals of the House of Commons,vol.81,p.97. (52)Court of Directors Minutes,1825-26,Bank of England Archive,G4/48,pp.258,260. (53)Court of Directors Minutes,1825-26,Bank of England Archive,G4/48,p.259. (54)John Clapham,The Bank of England:A History,vol.II,pp.2-3. (55)The Morning Chronicle,Wednesday,December 21,1825. (56)Thomas Doubleday,A Financial Monetary and Statistical History of England,London:Effingham Wilson,1847,p.291. (57)利物浦勋爵在1826年议会会季开始的第一天在上院宣称，从1823到1825年，“疯狂投机的热情蔓延，地方银行的钞票数量……翻倍……这难道还不足以……被当做过度交易和疯狂投机之全部恶果的原因吗？”“一英镑和两英镑的银行钞票应逐渐从流通中退出，代之以金属通货。”参见The Parliamentary Debates,new series,vol.XIV,pp.17-18. (58)"Bank of England",Parliamentary Papers,1826,vol.XIX,p.471. (59)The Parliamentary Debates,new series,vol.XIV,pp.126-127. (60)The Parliamentary Debates,new series,vol.XIV,pp.132-133. (61)Journals of the House of Commons,vol.81,1826,pp.41,43. (62)Journals of the House of Commons,vol.81,pp.107-108. (63)"7 Geo.IV,C.VI," The Statutes of the United Kingdom,1826,pp.4-7. (64)T.Joplin,An Essay on the General Principles and Present Practice of Banking in England and Scotland,second edition,Newcastle:Edward Walker,1822,pp.5-7. (65)The Parliamentary Debates,new series,vol.XIV,p.19. (66)"Bank of England," Parliamentary Papers,1826,vol.XIX,p.471. (67)利物浦勋爵的议会发言表达了这种思路：“如果能够诱使该行放弃其诸多……排他性特权，同时，如果因其妥协让他们得到某种想要的东西，也就是说，在本国的某些地方建立其机构的分行……将是最为有利的。”参见The Parliamentary Debates,new series,vol.XIV,p.19. (68)Directors' Annual Lists 1694-1908,Bank of England Archive,M5/436,p.131; Court of Directors Minutes,1825-26,Bank of England Archive,G4/48,pp.191,195. (69)英格兰银行《董事会备忘录》中的决议为此提供了毫无争议的证据：“首先，分行会大大增加英格兰银行钞票的发行量；第二，对于全部纸币流通，它们会赋予本行……更全面的控制力。它们也能够使本行防止再次发生我们最近所见的这般混乱；第三，分行存款的数额可能会非常大，并且伦敦的存款数额也会按照相应的程度增加；第四，如果政府要鼓励建立大的银行公司，为了保护英格兰银行免于它们的竞争，分行就变得绝对必要。”参见Court of Directors Minutes,1825-26,Bank of England Archive,G4/48,pp.194-195. (70)Court of Directors Minutes,1825-26,Bank of England Archive,G4/48,pp.216-217. (71)"Bank of England," Parliamentary Papers,1826,vol.XIX,p.471. (72)Court of Directors Minutes,1825-26,Bank of England Archive,G4/48,p.226. (73)Court of Directors Minutes,1825-26,Bank of England Archive,G4/48,pp.221-222. (74)Journals of the House of Commons,vol.81,pp.8,44; Journals of the House of Lords,vol.58,1826,p.299. (75)The Parliamentary Debates,new series,vol.XIV,p.142. (76)Journals of the House of Commons,vol.81,pp.107-108. (77)The Parliamentary Debates,new series,vol.XIV,p.148. (78)"7 Geo.IV,C.XLVI," The Statutes of the United Kingdom,1826,pp.130,136. (79)到1828年，英格兰银行已在曼彻斯特、伯明翰、利物浦等12个城市建立分行。参见John Clapham,The Bank of England:A History,vol.II,p.112. (80)D.Gavin Scott,History of the Rise and Progress of Joint Stock Banks in England,London:William Morrison,1837,p.5. (81)D.Gavin Scott,History of the Rise and Progress of Joint Stock Banks in England,p.5. (82)The Circular to Bankers,no.407,Friday,May 6,1836,pp.330-331. (83)Daniel Hardcastle,Banks and Bankers,London:Whittaker and Co.,1842,p.40. (84)Samuel Lloyd,The Lloyds of Birmingham,with Some Account of the Founding of Lloyds Bank,second edition,Birmingham:Cornish Borthers,1907,p.74. (85)共有伦敦、曼彻斯特、格拉斯哥、伯明翰等9个城市的商人得到垫付，1828年3月这笔款项才基本还清。参见Court of Directors Minutes,1827-28,Bank of England Archive,G4/50,pp.285-291. （本文原载于《历史研究》2017年第5期） (责任编辑：admin) |