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Second, owing to the weaknesses of social mobilization and strict government controls, a number of officials and gentry were able to gain control of self-government organs for their own purposes. The bourgeois democratic side of local self-government thereby lost out. Some scholars have maintained that local self-government was designed to preserve the social order and executed for the benefit of three groups: the bourgeois constitutionalists, the ruling official constitutionals, and conservative local gentry dedicated to protecting their own advantage.68 Aside from a few developed areas under the control of the new-style gentry merchants, the vast majority of local self-government organs in peripheral and backward areas were under the control of old-style local officials and gentry. Some of them used the opportunity presented by local self-government to increase taxes. Some of them used the opportunity presented by official power to exploit the community. A contemporary exposed the situation: “The local self-government of today is bureaucratic rule. It is gentry rule.”69 So-called local self-government “has become entirely a tool for murdering people!”70 The self-aggrandizement of local officials and gentry not only meant that local self-government lost the value it should have had but in particular led to unbearable harassment of the people. A tide of resistance against local self-government swept across many places. Jiangsu offers a good example of this. The relevant statistics show that from February 1910 to March 1911, thirty-seven instances of opposition to self-government occurred. Self-government offices were destroyed, schools were torn down, and self-government officers were beaten.71 It is worth noting that nearly all the instances of opposition to local self-government wore provoked by problems of finances, land, or buildings whereas none arose for political reasons. Opposition stemmed partly from the people’s unfamiliarity with local self-government, but the main factor was the strangulation and destruction of local self-government by the feudal ruling classes. Two conclusions emerge from a general survey of local self-government in the late Qing: First, the primary conditions for the development of modern Chinese politics were the ability in a timely and rational way to insert various kinds of new social forces into the political system, to put social mobilization and unification into practice, and to establish the political foundations for harmony and stability. In a sense, this was leading to the redistribution of political power and the reformulation of the political structure. However, the traditional Chinese political system had long remained a matter of “rulership” and never a reform of “administration.” Feudal politics constantly slid along the endless cycle of order and chaos. Although the local self-government movement was beginning to reform the sociopolitical structure, it still consisted chiefly of focusing on “rulership” for the feudal ruling classes. The goal of the Qing government was to establish the “assistant governing” position of the new gentry-merchants “as a means of compensating for deficiencies in official rule,”72 in order to strengthen imperial rule. The Qing gave no thought to the question of restructuring administration and thus had no way to satisfy the demands of the newly rising bourgeoisie or reach its goal of political unification. Since the bourgeoisie could not take power by peaceful means, it could only resort to violence. The Revolution of 19ll and the fall of the Qing were the necessary consequences of modern political developments. Second, the local self-government movement was shaped by two distinct forces: the moderate camp of the new bourgeoisie and the feudal ruling class. In fact, it portended a struggle for power between two new political forces. In this kind of struggle between two forces whose interests were totally different, the bourgeoisie should have directed its attention first to the class nature of local self-government and to the independent and democratic nature of political power. Unfortunately, the Chinese bourgeoisie, born in the historical conditions of a semicolonial and semifeudal society, was weak both in strength and in morale. The bourgeoisie merely tried to “reduce imperial powers and turn the people into citizens”73 within the logic and norms of the traditional political system. It took all their strength just to reach ihe stage of “cooperative rule between officials and gentry,” and they had no way to reach the goal of a real bourgeois democracy. However, in the final analysis, the attempts at local self-government did shake the foundations of feudal rule and did produce electoral systems and assemblies （even if mostly in form alone）。 In terms of traditional political life, this meant a certain democratic enlightenment and social mobilization. In sum, the local self-government movement of the late Qing was a forerunner of modern local political reform and opened a road to political modernization. Glossary of Terms bianfa difang zizhi fellzhi gongju zhi quan gongmin zizhi guanzhi guoquan minquan pingquan qunxue tongqing xiangguan xuanJu ziyou zizhi zizhi qi xiangyi zouqiang Notes l . See Zhou Zhongde and Yan Juxin, eds., Xiandaihua wenti tansuo （An xploration of the question of modernization） （Shanghai: Zhishi chubanshe, 1983）， p. 54. 2. “Geguo difang zizhi kao” （An examination of self-government in various nations）， Dongfang zazhi （Eastern miscellany） 4, no.10. 3. “Riben zhi difang zizhi” （Local self-government in Japan）， in ibid. 4. “Riben difang zizhi tiyao” （The essentials of local self-government in Japan）， Zhengzhi guanbao 22, no. 9, Guangxu 33, no. 3. 5. Fei Xiaotong, “Zai lun shuanggiii zhengzhi” （Restudy the two-track politics）， in xiangtu chongjian （the reestablishment of the countryside） （Shanghai: Shanghai shudian, 1948）， p. 58. 6. “Zhongguo difang zizhi kao,” Dongfang zazhi 4, no. 10. 7. Wu Han, “Shenquan” （Gentry power）， in Wu Han, Fei Xiaotong et al., eds., Huangquan yu shenquan （Imperial powers and gentry powers） （Tianjin: Renmin chubenshe, 1988）。 8. Geographical treatises of the Opium War period include Lin Zexu, ed., Sizhou zhi （Gazetteer of the four continents）； Wei Yuan, Haiguo tuzhi （Illus-trated gazetteer of the maritime nations）； Liang Tingnan, Hesheng guoshuo; Xu jiyu, Yinghuan zhilue （A brief survey of the maritime circuit）； and so forth. The diaries and travel accounts of embassy officials from about the 1860s include Bin Chun, Chengcha biji; Liu Xihong, Yingyao siji; Zhang Deyi, Shi Ying zaji; Liu Qitong, Yingfanshu zhenggai; Shen Dunhe, Yingjili guo zhilue; Xu Jianyin, Ouyou zalu; and Song Yuren, Taixi geguo caifengji. All these works included descriptions of the local assemblies and self-government systems of Western nations. 9. Feng Guifen, “Jiao-Bin lu kangyi” （Straightforward words from the lodge of early Zhou studies）， and “Fu xiangzhi yi” （In favor of returning to local government）， in Zhongguo jindai shiziliao congkan, Wuxu bianfa （The 1898 reform movement）， vol. l, pp. 1-38, esp. pp. 8-10 （Shanghai: Shenzhou guoguangshe, 1953）。 10. Zheng Guanying, Shengshi weiyan （Warnings to a prosperous age）； “Zixu” （Preface） and “Yiyuan” （Assemblies）， in ibid., vol. 1, pp. 40-42, 55-58. 11. Chen Qiu, Zhiping tongi （General discussion of order）， “Jiushi yaoyi” （The essentials of saving the age）， in ibid., vol. l , p. 228. |