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(21)Henry Kissinger, White House Years, p. 216. (22)Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, p. 366. (23)William Burr, “The Nixon Administration, the ‘Horror Strategy’, and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1972” , p.37. (24)Henry Kissinger, White House Years, p. 217. (25)Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Unclear Strategy, p. 377. (26)考夫曼、沃尔斯泰特、谢林等当时都是美国著名的战略学者，对核战略有着深刻而广泛的思考，特别是在“有限战争”、“恐怖平衡”、核威慑以及裁军等领域的研究颇有建树。更多内容参见刘磊《美国知识分子与美国核战略思想的演变(1945-1960)》，博士学位论文，华东师范大学历史系，2012年。 (27)Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, pp. 367-368.1970年，美军装备了民兵Ⅲ导弹，这是美国第三代洲际弹道导弹的最新型号，可携带三个核弹头，误差在220-280米以内。见徐光裕《核战略纵横》，国防大学出版社1987年版，第183页。 (28)William Burr, “The Nixon Administration, the‘Horror Strategy’, and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1972” , p.70.有关福斯特小组的具体形成及运作的具体过程，请参见Terry Terriff, The Nixon Administration and the Making of U. S. Nuclear Strategy, pp.97-158。 (29)韦斯同时也是国家安全委员会国防项目评估委员会(Defense Program Review Committee)成员，多次参与国防政策的讨论和评估。参见FRUS, 1969-1976，Vol.34，pp.629，715，804，931. (30)Fred Kaplan，The Wizards of Armageddon，pp.368-369，372.施莱辛格于1969年2月离开兰德公司，进入尼克松政府任职后。一直在华盛顿工作(历任代理预算局长、原子能委员会主席、中央情报局长直到任国防部长，他个人深得尼克松信任)，始终与五角大楼军事政策研究团队保持着密切联系。特别是他于1972年12月担任中情局长的时候，就十分了解“福斯特小组”的工作。鉴于他丰富的背景与经历，在与政府安全政策研究的核心人员保持密切联系和交流的过程中，自己的思想和研究成果也对他们产生了不可忽视的影响。 (31)HAK Talking Points DOD Strategic Targeting Study Briefing, Thursday, July 27, 1972, and Odeen to Kissinger, Secretary Laird' s Memo to the President Dated December 26, 1972, National Security Archives, http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/, 2013年2月19日. (32)Memorandum from Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs[Henry Kissinger], 13 July 1973, enclosing “NSSM 169 Summary Report”, 8 June 1973, p. 5, National Security Archives, http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/,2013年2月19日. (33)Memorandum from Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger to Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs[Henry Kissinger] , 13 July 1973, enclosing “NSSM 169 Summary Report,” 8 June 1973, p. 1. (34)National Security Decision Memorandum 242, “Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons,” January 17, 1974, pp.1-2, National Security Archives, http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/,2013年2月19日. (35)National Security Decision Memorandum 242, “Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons,” January 17, 1974, pp. 2-4. (36)Memorandum, Winston Lord to Secretary of State Kissinger, “NSSM 169-Nuclear Weapons Policy,” December 3, 1973, National Security Archives, http://www.gwu.edu/～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/,2013年2月19日. (37)Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Unclear Strategy, p. 378. (38)Terry Terriff, The Nixon Administration and the Making of U. S. Nuclear Strategy, p. 1. (39)Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Unclear Strategy, pp. 377-379. (40)Jeffrey Richelson, “Soviet Strategic Doctrine and Limited nuclear Operations: A Metagame Analysis”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 2(June, 1979), p. 326. (41)Barry Carter, “Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons”, Scientific American, Vol. 230, Issue 5(May 1974), pp. 24, 31. (42)Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. Labrie, eds. , Nuclear Strategy and National Security-Points of View, Washington, D. C. : American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977, pp. 85-86. (43)James Schlesinger, “Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975” , in Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. Labrie, eds. , Nuclear Strategy and National Security-Points of View, pp. 88-90. (44)James Schlesinger, “Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975” , pp. 93-95. (45)James Schlesinger, “Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975” , pp. 97-98. (46)James Schlesinger, “Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1975” , pp. 99-100. (47)James Schlesinger, “U. S. - -U. S. S. R. Strategic Policies”, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organizations Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 93rd Congress, 2d Session, March 4, 1974, in Robert J. Pranger and Roger P. Labile, eds. , Nuclear Strategy and National Security-Points of View, pp. 100-111. (48)Office of Secretary of Defense, “Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons,” 3 April 1974, with enclosure from Major Gen. John A. Wickham to General Scowcroft, 10 April 1974, pp. 3-8, National Security Archives, http://www.gwu.edu./～nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB173/, 2013年2月19日. (49)Office of Secretary of Defense, “Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons,” 3 April 1974, with enclosure from Major Gen. John A. Wickham to General Scowcroft, 10 April 1974, pp. 9-10. (50)Desmond Ball, “Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983,” in Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds. , Strategic Nuclear Targeting, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986, pp. 70-79. (51)Steven E. Miller, ed. , Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence, An International Security Reader, Princeton: Princeton University Press,1984, p. 197. (52)Richard Smoke, National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, An Introduction To The American Experience, New York: Newbery Award Records, Inc. , 1987, p. 206. (53)MX导弹是美国1972年开始研发的第四代洲际弹道导弹，可以携带10个30万吨当量的核弹头，其投掷误差为120米以内，性能优于民兵Ⅲ导弹。见Robert Aldridge, First Strike! The Pentagon's Strategy for Nuclear War，Boston: South End Press, 1983, pp.61-62, 103。除了MX与民兵Ⅲ导弹外，三叉戟C4潜射导弹于1975年11月首飞；新型战略轰炸机B-1B于1974年首飞，1976年12月生产；AGM-86巡航导弹于1976年开始发展，1979年首飞。参见王仲春、夏立平《美国核力量与核战略》，第116页。 (54)April Carter, Success and Failure in Arms Control Negotiation, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 147. (55)Benjamin Frankel, ed. , The Cold War, 1945-1991, Leaders and Other Important Figures in the United States and Western Europe, p. 445. (56)Henry Kissinger, White House Years, p. 217. (57)P. Edward Haley, David M. Keithly and Jack Merritt, eds. , Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the Future, p. 19. 另见王仲春、夏立平《美国核力量与核战略》，第118页。 (58)P. Edward Haley, David M. Keithly and Jack Merritt, eds. , Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and the Future, p. 18. (59)当年该战略在美国公布与推行之后，除了美国国内，还受到苏联、中国等社会主义核大国的重视和研究。参见[苏]波格丹诺夫等编《美国军事战略》，第54-56、194-202页。中国官方内部刊物《现代防御技术》1974年第3期，就发表《新的核战略政策》一文对施莱辛格公布的核战略进行了介绍。 (责任编辑：admin) |