|
六、结语 综上所述，从1934年2月国防需要委员会第一份报告首次提及“大陆义务”，直至第二次世界大战爆发前的几个月“大陆义务”被英国政府正式接受，漫长的过程可以体现出这背后的阻力和曲折。 首相张伯伦对于英国承担“大陆义务”是极其勉强的，他在家信中曾表示，“我相信如果只要外交部多加重视，重整军备与同德意搞好关系的双重政策能够使我们安全度过危险时期”(97)。张伯伦的观点代表了当时英国社会多数民众的心理，他们不愿意再次陷入像第一次世界大战中西线战场那样残酷的堑壕战，当时英国社会普遍认为，陆军的领导者应该为西线发生的恐怖杀戮负责。(98) 英国学者迈克尔·霍华德评价到：“三军参谋长是支持慕尼黑协定的第三集团的头脑，他们认为英国国力过于虚弱，难以进行战斗”，他们希望政府能够像1902-1907年那样通过外交手段使国家避免陷入一场超出自身能力的战争，“但是，自1904年以来，世界已经发生了改变。英国的潜在敌人现在不包括愿意以殖民扩张为代价换取欧洲安全的法国，或者是被国内革命和对外失利所撕裂的俄罗斯帝国……其次，本土防御和帝国防御的双重义务现在看上去显然是如此的压倒一切，以至于难以有多余的力量去完成英国国防政策的第三个传统目标，这个目标即使没有被彻底遗忘，现在也被视作是完全过时，即维持欧洲的势力均衡”。(99) 另一方面，即使正式接受了“大陆义务”，英国计划中的远征军无论从规模，还是装备和后备力量来看，也是远远不够的。英国官方军史学家诺曼·吉布斯指出，英方在英法参谋会谈中提出的上述新计划，受到了整体补给状况的制约，在高射炮、反坦克炮等武器装备方面存在诸多缺陷。(100)陆军在英国的三个军种中一直是最不受重视的。历史学家梅德利科特指出，“陆军最苦，因为在1938年以前，理论上一直认为，陆军的目的仅限于在欧洲击退或防止敌人的入侵，以及在欧洲以外的防御性行动，超出这个限度均构成为侵略战争作准备的行动”。(101)保罗·肯尼迪则指出，“在两次世界大战之间的大部分年头里，英国陆军又回复到维多利亚时代所起的作用：视俄国对印度的威胁为严重的战略威胁(尽管这种威胁比较抽象)，日常的军事活动是使当地居民保持安定”。(102) 造成如此情形的原因有英国传统上对海军的重视，也有政府和公众害怕遭受空袭而偏宠空军的因素，还有政府财政状况不允许三个军种都得到同样的待遇，某种程度上还有对法国的马奇诺防线能够抵御住德国进攻的判断，然而，即使英国政府考虑到了德军会借道比利时进攻法国，也绝不会想到法国会像后来现实中那样迅速的溃败。因此，英国政府一直存在这样的想法：法国主要承担陆地上的义务，英国主要承担海上和空中的义务。(103)布赖恩·邦德认为，“直到1939年1月，在对唯一可确定的欧洲盟国的未来作出保证的问题上，英国也没有表示出想象中应有的同情，哪怕是丝毫的姿态”(104)。英国决策者坚信，战争是以德国大规模空袭英国开始的，在这样的情况下，不是派遣远征军到大陆，而是将陆军留在国内参与防空和维持社会秩序，即使派遣远征军，也是在法国顶住德国的进攻之后，再由远征军和法军一起发起反攻。(105) 但是，在形势的发展变化和法国的一再请求下，英国政府最终承担起了“大陆义务”，“三军参谋长明显来了个一百八十度的态度大转变”(106)。之所以出现这种情况，一是因其担心法国败亡或滑向德国，将使英国陷入难以支撑的孤军奋战局面；二是因为低地国家传统上是英国的前沿防御地带，是其核心利益所在，只有与法国共同作战，才有希望确保低地国家的安全，使本土无忧。 注释： ①国外相关研究的代表性成果为：6卷本的英国官方军事史《大战略》中的第1卷N.H.Gibbs,Grand Strategy,vol.1,London:HMSO,1976,以及Brian Bond,British Military Policy between the Two World Wars,Oxford:Clarendon Press,1980; Michael Howard,The Continental Commitment:The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars,New York:The Ashfield Press,1989.目前国内尚未有专门的研究。 ②Albert V.Tucker,“Army and Society in England 1870-1900:A Reassessment of the Cardwell Reforms”,The Journal of British Studies,Vol.12,No.2(May,1963),p.111. ③大陆义务，指英国基于传统的“势力均衡”政策，为恢复欧洲均势，从而承担介入欧洲大陆战争的责任。 ④Geoffrey P.Megargee,The Army before Last:British Military Policy,1919-1939 and Its Relevance for the U.S.Army Today,Santa Monica:Rand,2000,pp.1-2. ⑤Hastings L.Ismay,The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay,New York:The Viking Press,1960,p.94. ⑥Brian Bond,British Military Policy between the Two World Wars,p.41. ⑦CAB 23/15,W.C.616A,Minutes of a Meeting of the War Cabinet,15th August 1919. ⑧CAB 24/159,C.P.200(23),Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War,17th April 1923. ⑨Anthony Clayton,The British Empire as a Superpower,1919-1939,London:Macmillan,1986,pp.27-28. ⑩N.H.Gibbs,Grand Strategy,vol.1,p.52. (11)CAB 53/12/8,C.O.S.36,Memo by Foreign Office for Chiefs of Staff Annual Review of Defence Policy 1926,16th April 1926. (12)CAB 53/12/10,C.O.S.41,Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee Review of Imperial Defence,22nd June 1926. (13)A.J.P.Taylor,English History 1914-1945,Oxford:Oxford University Press,1982,p.222. (14)CAB 24/188,C.P.207(27),Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War,19th July 1927. (15)CAB 23/55,C.C.45(27)5,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,28th July 1927. (16)Michael Howard,The Continental Commitment,pp.90-91. (17)Michael Howard,The Continental Commitment,p.91. (18)Brian Bond,British Military Policy between the Two World Wars,p.31. (19)A.J.P.Taylor,English History 1914-1945,p.229. (20)CAB 53/22/10,C.O.S.295,Imperial Defence Policy:Annual Review for 1932by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee,23rd February 1932; CAB 24/229,C.P.104(32),Imperial Defence Policy:Note by Sir M.Hankey,17th March 1932. (21)指比利时、荷兰和卢森堡。 (22)CAB 24/247,C.P.64(34),Report of the Defence Requirements Sub-committee,28th February 1934. (23)布赖恩·邦德和马丁·亚历山大：《利德尔·哈特和戴高乐：有限义务与机动防御》，彼得·帕雷特主编：《现代战略的缔造者：从马基雅维利到核时代》，北京：世界知识出版社，2006年，第595页。 (24)N.H.Gibbs,Grand Strategy,Vol.I,p.111; Michael Howard,The Continental Commitment,p.107. (25)Anthony Adamthwaite,ed.,British Documents on Foreign Affairs:Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print(以下为BDFA),Part II,Series F,Vol.30,Frederick,Maryland:University Publications of America,1993,pp.64-67. (26)CAB 23/79,C.C.23(34)2,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,6th June 1934; C.C.26(34)4,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,27th June 1934. (27)CAB 53/24/3,C.O.S.343,Report by the Chiefs of Staff:Strategical Implications of a Declaration Concerning Belgian Security,7th July 1934; CAB 24/249,C.P.175(34),Strategical Implications of a Declaration Concerning Belgian Security:Note by Sir M.Hankey,9th July 1934. (28)CAB 23/79,C.C.28(34)2,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,11th July 1934. (29)1934年法国和苏联为防止德国侵略，拟邀请德国、捷克斯洛伐克、波兰、芬兰、波罗的海三国等签订安全互助公约，法国外交部长路易·巴都(Louis Barthou)主张法国对东欧国家承担安全义务。 (30)1868至1874年间任英国陆军大臣的爱德华·卡德维尔进行了一系列陆军现代化的改革，废除了贵族阶层购买军职和花钱晋升的制度，将陆军总司令从皇室控制下纳入陆军部管辖之下，制定6年预备队再6年正规军的服役规定，并建立一对一的制度，例如海外有一个营，那么在国内相应有一个营的预备力量，然后定期轮换。这一制度的缺点随一战后英国海外负担的增加而显现，详细见Albert V.Tucker,“Army and Society in England 1870-1900:A Reassessment of the Cardwell Reforms”,The Journal of British Studies,Vol.12,No.2.(May,1963),pp.110-141; Thomas F.Gallagher,“Cardwellian Mysteries:The Fate of the British Army Regulation Bill,1871”,The Historical Journal,Vol.18,No.2(Jun.,1975),pp.327-348. (31)N.H.Gibbs,Grand Strategy,Vol.I,pp.114-117; Michael Howard,The Continental Commitment,pp.108-110. (32)CAB 23/79,C.C.31(34)1and Appendix,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,31st July 1934. (33)Brian Bond,British Military Policy between the Two World Wars,pp.208-212. (34)CAB 24/259,C.P.26(36),Programmes of the Defence Services:Third Report of Defence Requirements Sub-committee,21st November 1935. (35)CAB 23/83,C.C.10(36)1,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,25th February 1936. (36)Robert Self,ed.,The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters,Vol.Four,Aldershot:Ashgate Publishing Limited,2005,Chamberlain to Hilda,9Feb.1934,p.175. (37)利德尔·哈特：《战略论：间接路线战略》，北京：战士出版社，1981年，第482页。 (38)Brian Bond,Liddell Hart:A Study of His Military Thought,New Jersey:Rutgers University Press,1977,ch.3:The British Way in Warfare 1930-34,pp.65-85and ch.4:Limited Liability 1935-39,pp.88-115. (39)Keith Feiling,The Life of Neville Chamberlain,p.313. (40)CAB 24/265,C.P.334(36),Memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer on the Role of the British Army,11th December 1936. (41)CAB 53/30/5,C.O.S.550,Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee:Role of the British Army,28th January 1937; CAB 24/267,C.P.41(37),Report by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee:Role of the British Army,28th January 1937. (42)1936年3月新设立的内阁职位，隶属于首相而不是内阁，没有相应的部级机构，只拥有少量的隶属个人的办事人员，用以协调与国防相关各部之间的关系，侧重于解决各军种军费支出上的竞争问题。在首相缺席时，其负责主持帝国国防委员会和参谋长委员会会议，基本站在财政大臣和首相的立场，最初影响很有限，1937年5月张伯伦任首相后，影响逐渐扩大。 (43)CAB 24/267,C.P.46(37),Memorandum by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence,2nd February 1937. (44)CAB 23/87,C.C.5(37)14,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,3rd February 1937. (45)CAB 24/269,C.P.115(37),Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War,23rd April 1937. (46)CAB 23/88,C.C.20(37)4,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,5th May 1937. (47)Robert Self,ed.,The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters,Vol.Four,Chamberlain to Ida,6Feb,1937,p.233. (48)Brian Bond,British Military Policy between the Two World Wars,p.225. (49)Robert Self,ed.,The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters,Vol.Four,Chamberlain to Hilda,30May 1937,p.251. (50)Stephen Roskill,Hankey:Man of Secrets,Vol.III,London:Collins,1974,p.290. (51)J.P.D.Dunbabin,“British Rearmament in the 1930s:A Chronology and Review”,The Historical Journal,Vol.18,no.3(Sep.,1975),p.602. (52)N.H.Gibbs,Grand Strategy,Vol.I,p.495. (53)Stephen Roskill,Hankey:Man of Secrets,Vol.III,pp.285、291. (54)安东尼·艾登：《艾登回忆录——面对独裁者》(下)，北京：商务印书馆，1977年，第875页。 (55)CAB 24/273,C.P.316(37),Interim Report by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence,15th December 1937. (56)CAB 23/90a,C.C.48(37)9/C.C.49(37)1,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,22nd December 1937. (57)CAB 24/274,C.P.26(38),Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War:The Organization of the Army for Its Role in War,10th February 1938. (58)CAB 23/93,C.C.16(38)6,23rd March 1938. (59)Brian Bond,British Military Policy between the Two World Wars,p.270. (60)Uri Bialer,“The British Chiefs of Staff and the‘Limited Liability’Formula of 1938,a Note”,Military Affairs,Vol.42,no.2(Apr.,1978),pp.98-99.英国在海岸部署了51个雷达站，并由一个中央控制室与战斗机指挥系统有效地联系在一起。 (61)Talbot Imlay,“The Making of the Anglo-French Alliance,1938-39”,in Martin S.Alexander and W.J.Philpott,eds.,Anglo-French Defence Relations between the Wars,New York:Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.,2002,p.101. (62)安东尼·艾登：《艾登回忆录——面对独裁者》(下)，第620、625页。 (63)周以光：《法国在莱茵兰事件中采取的退让政策及其经济背景》，齐世荣主编：《绥靖政策研究》，北京：首都师范大学出版社，1998年，第110-129页。 (64)CAB 23/83,C.C.28(36)3and Appendix,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,8th April 1936. (65)CAB 24/261,C.P.110(36),The Staff Conversations with French and Belgium Representatives,20th April 1936. (66)Talbot Imlay,“The Making of the Anglo-French Alliance,1938-39”,in Martin S.Alexander and W.J.Philpott,eds.,Anglo-French Defence Relations between the Wars,p.99. (67)CAB 53/36/4,C.O.S.680,Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee:Staff Conversations with France and Belgium,4th February 1938; CAB 24/274,C.P.35(38),Staff Conversations with France and Belgium:Note by Sir M.Hankey,14th February 1938. (68)Michael Howard,The Continental Commitment,p.118. (69)CAB 23/92,C.C.5(38)12,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,16th February 1938. (70)CAB 23/93,C.C.18(38)7,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,6th April 1938. (71)CAB 24/276,C.P.94(38),Annex I:Conclusions of the 319th Meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence Held on the 11th April 1938; Annex III:Report of Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee:Staff Conversations with France and Belgium,8th April 1938; CAB 23/93,C.C.19(38)4,13th April 1938. (72)CAB 24/276,C.P.109(38),Record of an Anglo-French Conversation,28th and 29th April,1938. (73)CAB 23/93,C.C.,26(38)4,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,25th May 1938. (74)Robert Self,ed.,The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters,Vol.Four,Chamberlain to Hilda,6Nov,1938,p.361. (75)CAB 24/280,C.P.269(38),Record of the Anglo-French Conversations 24th November 1938; E.L.Woodward and Rohan Butler,eds.,Documents British on Foreign Policy,1919-1939,Third Series,Vol.III,London:His Majesty’s Stationery Office,1950,pp.291-292. (76)Talbot Imlay,“The Making of the Anglo-French Alliance,1938-39”,in Martin S.Alexander and W.J.Philpott,eds.,Anglo-French Defence Relations between the Wars,p.107. (77)Brian Bond,British Military Policy between the Two World Wars,pp.272、279. (78)CAB 24/283,C.P.28(39),Report of Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee:State of Preparedness of the Army in Relation to Its Role,25th January 1939. (79)Talbot Imlay,“The Making of the Anglo-French Alliance,1938-39”,in Martin S.Alexander and W.J.Philpott,ed.,Anglo-French Defence Relations between the Wars,p.107. (80)BDFA,Part II,Series F,Vol.23,pp.219-224. (81)CAB 53/44/7,C.O.S.833,Report by the Chiefs of Staff:The Strategic Position of France in a European War,1st February 1939. (82)CAB 53/44/4,C.O.S.829,Report of Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee:German Aggression Against Holland,24th January 1939; CAB 24/282,C.P.20(39),German Aggression Against Holland:Note by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence,24th January 1939. (83)CAB 53/44/4,C.O.S.830,Report of Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee:German Aggression against Holland,25th January 1939; CAB 24/282,C.P.3(39),Report by the Foreign Policy Committee,27th January 1939. (84)CAB 23/97,C.C.2(39)1,25th January 1939. (85)CAB 23/97,C.C.3(39)1,1st February 1939. (86)CAB 24/282,C.P.27(39),Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War,13th December 1938.机动师的力量包括9个坦克营、1个装甲车团、2个步兵营和2个炮兵团，改编后的较小规模的2个机动师各有6个坦克营，其余组成力量做相应的分配。 (87)CAB 53/44/3,C.O.S.827,Report of Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee:State of Preparedness of the Army in Relation to Its Role,25th January 1939; CAB 24/283,C.P.28(39),Note by the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence,28th January 1939. (88)CAB 24/283,C.P.34(39),Memorandum by the Secretary of State for War:Measures to Accelerate the Despatch of the Field Force to the Continent,1st February 1939. (89)CAB 23/97,C.C.5(39)3,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,2nd February 1939. (90)CAB 24/283,C.P.49(39),Memorandum by the Prime Minister:The State of Preparedness of the Army in Relation to Its Role,18th February 1939. (91)CAB 23/97,C.C.8(39)6,Conclusions of a Meeting of the Cabinet,22nd February 1939. (92)基斯·米德尔马斯：《绥靖战略》，上海：上海译文出版社，1978年，第766页。 (93)Michael Howard,The Continental Commitment,p.128. (94)CAB 23/98,C.C.15(39)5,29th March 1939. (95)Robert Self,ed.,The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters,Vol.Four,Chamberlain to Hilda,19Mar,1939,p.394. (96)N.H.Gibbs,Grand Strategy,Vol.I,p.515. (97)Robert Self,ed.,The Neville Chamberlain Diary Letters,Vol.Four,Chamberlain to Hilda,1Aug,1937,p.264. (98)Brian Bond and Williamson Murray,“The British Armed Force,1918-39”,in Allan R.Millett and W.Murray,eds.,Military Effectiveness,Vol.II,Boston:Allen & Unwin,1990,p.100. (99)Michael Howard,The Continental Commitment,pp.119-120,122. (100)N.H.Gibbs,Grand Strategy,Vol.I,p.51,note. (101)W·N·梅德利科特：《英国现代史1914-1964》，北京：商务印书馆，1990年，第358页。 (102)保罗·肯尼迪：《大国的兴衰》，北京：国际文化出版公司，2014年，第309页。 (103)Geoffrey P.Megargee,The Army before Last:British Military Policy,1919-1939and Its Relevance for the U.S.Army Today,pp.10,22. (104)Brian Bond,British Military Policy between the Two World Wars,p.289. (105)Brian Bond,British Military Policy between the Two World Wars,pp.279、283、313、316. (106)Michael Howard,The Continental Commitment,p.127. (责任编辑：admin) |