③FRUS 1950, IV. Central and Eastern Europe; Soviet Union GPO, 1981, p. 305; p. 296. 美国负责公共事务助理国务卿在一份题为“在心理战领域主动进取”的报告中则讲是总统3月9日批准了该文件。
    ④Project Hartwell，美国海军资助项目，开始于1950年6月，是专门用来研究美国海外运输安全，特别是寻找对付苏联新型潜艇的办法。
    ⑤即暗示用古希腊传说中的特洛伊木马神话，古希腊人久攻特洛伊城不下，便想出一计，造巨大木马让士兵藏匿其中，在部队假装撤退后，将木马摈弃在特洛伊城外，乘敌人将木马当作战利品移入城内，庆祝胜利之机，希腊军队士兵从木马中爬出，与城外军队里应外合攻下了特洛伊城。
    ⑥附录1. 政治战；附录2. 海外旅游者；附录3. 邮件；附录4. 物品分发；附录5. 负荷过重和延误；附录6. 阿尔巴尼亚；附录7. 两种“主义”；附录8. 政治战--美国对苏联；附录9. 美国派驻东南亚和其它落后地区的援助人员；附录10. 人口问题；附录11. 对政治战的学术研究支持；附录12. 叛逃者；附录13. 前瞻性计划；附录14. 公众舆论；附录15. 斯大林；附录16. 项目组成员简历；附录17. 结论；附录18. 特洛伊计划简介；附录19. 电离层情况；附录20. 高能广播；附录21. 接收机；附录22. 宽波段传送--大西洋通讯；附录23. 波段调制技术的应用；附录24. 无线电情报；附录25. 月球中继站；附录26. 杂项。
    ⑦1951年4月4日，杜鲁门在一份行政命令中决定成立国家“心理战略委员会”（Psychological Strategy Board: PSB）。在这份文件后面的是巴雷特写给Webb的关于筹建心理战略委员会的备忘录，上面清楚地写明，要建立统一的心理战组织机构。CK3100310373，DDRS.
    ⑧NIE 11, Soviet Intentions In The Current Situation, 5-Dec-50; NIE 15, Probable Soviet Moves To Exploit The Present Situation, 11-Dec-50; NIE 17, Probable Soviet Reactions To A Remilitarization Of Western Germany, 27-Dec-50; NIE 2/2, Soviet Participation In The Air Defense Of Manchuria, 27-Nov-50; NIE 3, Soviet Capabilities And Intentions, 15-Nov-50; NIE 18, Probability Of Soviet Employment Of Bw And Cw In The Event Of Attacks Upon The Us, 10-Jan-51; NIE 22, Vulnerability Of The Soviet Bloc To Economic Warfare, 19-Feb-5; NIE 25, Probable Soviet Courses Of Action To Mid-1952, 2-Aug-51; NIE 29, Probability Of An Invasion Of Yugoslavia In 1951, 20-Mar-51; NIE 29/1, Review Of The Conclusions Of Nie-29" Probability Of An Invasion Of Yugoslavia In 1951" , 4-May-51; NIE 31;Soviet Capabilities For Clandestine Attack Against The Us With Weapons Of Mass Destruction And The Vulnerability Of The Us To Such Attack （ Mid-1951 To Mid-1952） , 4-Sep 51; NIE 33, Soviet Control Of The European Satellites And Their Economic And Military Contributions To Soviet Power Through Mid-1953, 7-Nov-51; NIE 4, Soviet Courses Of Action With Respect To Germany, 1-Feb-51; NIE 43, The Strategic Importance Of The Far East To The Ussr, 13-Nov-51; NIE 55, Communist Capabilities And Probable Courses Of Action In Korea Through Mid-1962, Federation of American Scientists. http: //www. fas. org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68. 2006-01.
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