(78)Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow,Essence of Decision,p.227; Ernest May and Philip Zelikow,eds.,The Kennedy Tapes,p.119.
    (79)The Atlantic Command,"CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis," pp.18-19; Jean R.Moenk,"USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962," p.63.
    (80)Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff,“Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis," p.52; Lawrence Chang and Peter Kornbluh,The Cuban Missile Crisis,p.186.
    (81)Taylor,"Timing Factors," 25 October 1962,DNSA/Cuba,no.1326; The Atlantic Command,"CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis," pp.67-68; Walter S.Poole,The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,vol.8,p.178.
    (82)Adam Yarmolinsky,"Department of Defense Operations During the Cuban Crisis," p.18; Alice George,Awaiting Armageddon:How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis,Chapel Hill:The University of North Carolina Press,2003,pp.65-66.
    (83)Walter S.Poole,The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,vol.8,p.179; Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff,“Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis," pp.46,49; FRUS,1961-1963,vol.11,p.267.
    (84)Sheldon Stern,The Week the World Stood Still,Stanford:Stanford University Press,2005,p.188; Dino Brugioni,Eyeball to Eyeball,pp.463-464.
    (85)"Cuba Fact Sheet," 27 October 1962,DNSA/Cuba,no.1477; Lawrence Kaplan et al.,History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,vol.5,p.213; USAF Historical Division Liaison Office,"The Air Force Response to the Cuban Crisis," p.8.
    (86)Walter Poole,The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,vol.8,p.180; Ernest May and Philip Zelikow,eds.,The Kennedy Tapes,p.635.
    (87)US Army,"US Army in the Cuban Crisis," p.4.
    (88)"Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," p.28; Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali,"One Hell of a Gamble":Khrushchev,Castro,and Kennedy,1958-1964,New York:Norton,1997,p.299.
    (89)Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff,"Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis," pp.97-98; Michael Dobbs,One Minute to Midnight:Kennedy,Khrushchev,and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War,New York:Alfred A.Knopf,2008,pp.95,249.
    (90)Lawrence Kaplan et al.,History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,vol.5,p.225; Walter Poole,The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,vol.8,pp.233-234; Jean R.Moenk,"USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962," pp.26-29.
    (91)Marcus Pohlmann,"Constraining Presidents at the Brink:The Cuban Missile Crisis," Presidential Studies Quarterly,vol.19,no.2,Spring 1989,pp.340-341.
    (92)The Atlantic Command,"CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis," pp.55-56; US Army,"US Army in the Cuban Crisis," p.8.
    (93)Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow,Essence of Decision,pp.204-205; Len Scott,The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Threat of Nuclear War,London:Continuum,2007,p.38.
    (94)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.11,pp.173-174; Ernest May and Philip Zelikow,eds.,The Kennedy Tapes,p.338.
    (95)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.11,p.381.
    (96)Alice George,Awaiting Armageddon,p.41.
    (97)Richard Betts,Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance,Washington,D.C.:Brookings Institution,1978,p.115.
    (98)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.15,p.347.
    (99)Anatoli Gribkov and William Smith,Operation Anadyr,p.151; Gregg Herken,Counsels of War,New York:Alfred A.Knopf,1985,p.168; Richard Kohn and Joseph Harahan,"U.S.Strategic Air Power,1948-1962," International Security,vol.12,no.4,1988,pp.93-94.