(32)Tomas Diez Acosta,October 1962:The "Missile" Crisis as Seen from Cuba,New York:Pathfinder,2002,p.87.
    (33)Walter S.Poole,The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,vol.8,1961-1964,Washington,D.C.:Office of Joint History/Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,2011,pp.160-161; Mark White,The Kennedys and Cuba,Chicago:Ivan R.Dee,1999,pp.110-115,118-119.
    (34)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.10,p.785.
    (35)Robert Weisbrot,Maximum Danger,Chicago:Ivan R.Dee,2001,p.83; Dino Brugioni,Eyeball to Eyeball:The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis,New York:Random House,1991,pp.112-114.
    (36)Jeremy Pressman,"September Statements,October Missiles,November Elections," Security Studies,vol.10,no.3,2001,p.88; Arthur M.Schlesinger,Jr.,Robert Kennedy and His Times,p.506; David Larson,The Cuban Crisis of 1962,Boston:Houghton Mifflin,1963,pp.5-6.
    (37)Theodore Sorensen,Kennedy,New York:Harper &.Row,1965,pp.669-670; Arthur M.Schlesinger,Jr.,Robert Kennedy and His Times,p.506.
    (38)Thomas Paterson and William Brophy,"October Missiles and November Elections:The Cuban Missile Crisis and American Politics,1962," Journal of American History,vol.73,no.1,1986,p.88; Robert Dallek,An Unfinished Life:John F.Kennedy,1917-1963,Boston:Little,Brown and Company,2003,p.540.
    (39)Tom Smith,"The Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.Public Opinion," Public Opinion Quarterly,vol.67,no.2,2003,pp.266-267.
    (40)Robert Weisbrot,Maximum Danger,p.86; James Nathan,Anatomy of the Cuban Missile Crisis,Westport:Greenwood Press,2001,p.84.
    (41)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.10,pp.868-869,917-920.
    (42)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.10,pp.790-792,800-801,955-956.
    (43)CIA NIE 85-2-62,"The Situation and Prospects in Cuba," 1 August 1962,DNSA/Cuba,no.256.
    (44)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.10,pp.947-949; Mary McAuliffe,ed.,CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis,1962,Washington,D.C.:CIA History Staff,1992,p.23.
    (45)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.10,pp.957-958.
    (46)Clara Nieto,Masters of War,New York:Seven Stories Press,2003,p.79; Tomas Diez Acosta,October 1962,p.85.
    (47)US Marine Corps Emergency Action Center,"Summary of Items of Significant Interest," DNSA/Cuba,no.571.
    (48)Norman Polmar and John Gresham,De f con-2:Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War during the Cuban Missile Crisis,Hoboken:John Wiley & Sons,2006,p.133; Mark White,Missile in Cuba,Chicago:Ivan R.Dee,1997,p.76.
    (49)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.10,pp.1082-1083.
    (50)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.10,p.1081; Lawrence Kaplan et al.,History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense,vol.5,p.203.
    (51)Walter S.Poole,The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,vol.8,p.162.
    (52)USAF Historical Division Liaison Office,"The Air Force Response to the Cuban Crisis," DNSA/Cuba,no.1361,p.21; The Atlantic Command,"CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis," pp.19,163.
    (53)Walter S.Poole,The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,vol.8,p.164; Michael C.Desch,"That Deep Mud in Cuba," p.336.
    (54)Adam Yarmolinsky,"Department of Defense Operations During the Cuban Crisis," 12 February 1963,DNSA/Cuba,no.2925,p.1; The Atlantic Command,"CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis," p.39.
    (55)The Atlantic Command,"CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis," pp.41-42; Weapon Systems Evaluation Group,"Historical Analysis of Command and Control Actions in the 1962 Cuban Crisis," pp 67-68; FRUS,1961-1963,vol.11,Washington,D.C.:US Government Printing House,1996,pp.6-7.
    (56)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.11,pp.10-11; Robert McNamara,"Presidential Interest in SA-2 Missiles System and Contingency Planning for Cuba," 4 October 1962,DNSA/Cuba,no.515.