(57)The Atlantic Command,"CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis," pp.39-40,154; John M.Young,When the Russians Blinked:The U.S.Maritime Response to the Cuban Missile Crisis,Washington,D.C.:US Marine Corps,1990,pp.66-67.
    (58)The Atlantic Command,"CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis," pp.44-45; Jean R.Moenk,"USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962," p.9.
    (59)US Army,"US Army in the Cuban Crisis," p.2; Mark White,The Kennedys and Cuba,pp.167-168.
    (60)James Nathan,ed.,The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited,New York; St.Martin's Press,1992,p.250;Richard Lebow and Janice Stein,We All Lost the Cold War,Princeton:Princeton University Press,1994,p.26.
    (61)The Atlantic Command,"CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis," pp.2-3; Adam Yarmolinsky,"Department of Defense Operations During the Cuban Crisis," p.l.
    (62)FRUS,1961-1963,vol.11,p.159; Philip Brenner,"Cuba and the Missile Crisis," Journal of Latin American Studies,vol.22,no.l,1990,pp.121-122.
    (63)"Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," 15 November 1962,DNSA/Cuba,no.1183,pp.3-4; Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff,"Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis," 21 December 1962,DNSA/Cuba,no.2780,pp.9-12; Anatoli Gribkov and William Smith,Operation Anadyr,Chicago:Edition Q,1994,pp.125-126,132.
    (64)Ernest May and Philip D.Zelikow,eds.,The Kennedy Tapes,Cambridge:The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1997,pp.58-59,63.
    (65)Anderson Oral History.25 April 1967,pp.4-5,John F.Kennedy Library; George Anderson,"The Cuban Blockade:An Admiral's Memoir," The Washington Quarterly,vol.5,no.4,1982,p.84.
    (66)Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff,"Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis," pp.14-15,17-18; Walter S.Poole,The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy,vol.8,p.169.
    (67)Ernest May and Philip Zelikow,eds.,The Kennedy Tapes,pp.177-178,182,185-186; "Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," p.10.
    (68)Ernest May and Philip Zelikow,eds.,The Kennedy Tapes,pp.178-179,181-182; Norman Polmar and John Gresham,Defcon-2,p.279.
    (69)Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff,"Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis," p.19.
    (70)"Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff," pp.9-10; Ernest May and Philip Zelikow,eds.,The Kennedy Tapes,p.184.
    (71)Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff,"Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis," p.23.
    (72)Steven Rearden,Council of War:A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,1942-1991,Washington,D.C.:NDU Press,2012,p.232; Richard Kohn and Joseph Harahan,Strategic Air Warfare,Washington,D.C.:Office of Air Force History,1988,pp.114,119.
    (73)Ernest May and Philip Zelikow,eds.,The Kennedy Tapes,pp.205-206.
    (74)Robert Kennedy,Thirteen Days,New York:Norton,1969,p.38.
    (75)Fred Kaplan,The Wizards of Armageddon,Stanford:Stanford University Press,1991,p.305; Theodore Sorensen,Kennedy,p.685.
    (76)Theodore Sorensen,Counselor,New York:HarperCollins,2008,p.295; Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow,Essence of Decision:Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis,New York:Longman,1999,p.120.
    (77)Adam Yarmolinsky,"Department of Defense Operations During the Cuban Crisis," pp.9,12; US Army,"US Army in the Cuban Crisis," pp.3,6; John M.Young,When the Russians Blinked,pp.71-73.