（57）The Atlantic Command, “CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis,” pp. 39-40, 154; John M. Young, When the Russians Blinked: The U. S. Maritime Response to the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington, D. C.: US Marine Corps, 1990, pp. 66-67.
    （58）The Atlantic Command, “CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis,” pp. 44-45; Jean R. Moenk, “USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962,” p.9.
    （59）US Army, “US Army in the Cuban Crisis,” p.2; Mark White, The Kennedys and Cuba, pp. 167-168.
    （60）James Nathan, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, New York; St. Martin‘s Press, 1992, p.250;Richard Lebow and Janice Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, Princeton: Princeton University Press,1994, p.26.
    （61）The Atlantic Command, “CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis,” pp. 2-3; Adam Yarmolinsky, “Department of Defense Operations During the Cuban Crisis,” p. l.
    （62）FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 11, p. 159; Philip Brenner, “Cuba and the Missile Crisis,” Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 22, no. l, 1990, pp. 121-122.
    （63）“Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” 15 November 1962, DNSA/Cuba, no. 1183, pp. 3-4; Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis,” 21 December 1962, DNSA/Cuba, no. 2780, pp. 9-12; Anatoli Gribkov and William Smith, Operation Anadyr, Chicago: Edition Q, 1994, pp. 125-126, 132.
    （64）Ernest May and Philip D. Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes, Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997, pp. 58-59, 63.
    （65）Anderson Oral History. 25 April 1967, pp. 4-5, John F. Kennedy Library; George Anderson, “The Cuban Blockade: An Admiral’s Memoir,” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 5, no. 4, 1982, p.84.
    （66）Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis,” pp.14-15, 17-18; Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 8, p.169.
    （67）Ernest May and Philip Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 177-178, 182, 185-186; “Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” p.10.
    （68）Ernest May and Philip Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 178-179, 181-182; Norman Polmar and John Gresham, Defcon-2, p.279.
    （69）Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis,” p.19.
    （70）“Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” pp. 9-10; Ernest May and Philip Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes, p.184.
    （71）Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis,” p. 23.
    （72）Steven Rearden, Council of War: A History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1991, Washington, D. C.: NDU Press, 2012, p.232; Richard Kohn and Joseph Harahan, Strategic Air Warfare, Washington, D. C.: Office of Air Force History, 1988, pp. 114, 119.
    （73）Ernest May and Philip Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes, pp. 205-206.
    （74）Robert Kennedy, Thirteen Days, New York: Norton, 1969, p.38.
    （75）Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991, p. 305; Theodore Sorensen, Kennedy, p.685.
    （76）Theodore Sorensen, Counselor, New York: HarperCollins, 2008, p.295; Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: Longman, 1999, p.120.
    （77）Adam Yarmolinsky, “Department of Defense Operations During the Cuban Crisis,” pp. 9, 12; US Army, “US Army in the Cuban Crisis,” pp. 3, 6; John M. Young, When the Russians Blinked, pp. 71-73.
    （78）Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, p.227; Ernest May and Philip Zelikow, eds., The Kennedy Tapes, p.119.
    （79）The Atlantic Command, “CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis,” pp.18-19; Jean R. Moenk,“USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962,” p. 63.
    （80）Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Chronology of JCS Decisions Concerning the Cuban Crisis,” p.52; Lawrence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, The Cuban Missile Crisis, p.186.
    （81）Taylor, “Timing Factors,” 25 October 1962, DNSA/Cuba, no. 1326; The Atlantic Command, “CINCLANT Historical Account of Cuban Crisis,” pp. 67-68; Walter S. Poole, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 8, p.178.
    （82）Adam Yarmolinsky, “Department of Defense Operations During the Cuban Crisis,” p. 18; Alice George, Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003, pp. 65-66.