此外，美国领导人也高度关注当时另一个热点地区，那就是柏林。不论是古巴导弹危机发生之前还是之后，柏林始终是美国政府的一根软肋。与古巴相比，苏联在这里占有相对优势，特别是在常规力量方面。自1958年11月以来，美苏两国在柏林展开了新一轮的激烈角逐，双方剑拔弩张，战争一触即发。肯尼迪及其主要顾问大都认为，柏林局势与古巴紧密相连，如果美国对古巴采取行动，苏联势必会在柏林做出反应，夺取整个柏林。腊斯克等人甚至确信，苏联领导人之所以在古巴部署导弹，就是为了声东击西，转移美国人的视线，或刺激美国对古巴动武，以便趁机将西方势力完全赶出柏林。（97）1962年10月初，肯尼迪曾向西柏林市长勃兰特表示，“柏林是美国的关键承诺”，“如果不是因为柏林，我们可以在古巴自由采取行动”。这句话虽然对柏林因素的制约作用有些夸大其词，但也的确道出了柏林与古巴之间的内在联系。（98）
    美国军方和政府中的一些“鹰派”分子一味地要求使用武力解决问题，确信导弹危机为美国推翻古巴政府提供了难得的机会。军方领导人先后提交了24份报告要求采取军事行动，认为不论是在战略力量还是常规力量方面美国都具有明显的优势，这意味着如果美国对古巴采取行动不会有“真正的战争危险”，苏联进行报复或做出军事反应的可能性非常小，甚至完全没有，除了退却之外别无选择；美国面临的最大危险是无所作为，而不是采取空袭和入侵古巴这类具有“决定性”意义的行动。（99）这显然是大大低估了当时的战争风险。肯尼迪坚持军事行动必须同外交谈判协调起来，并服从于政治的需要，通过妥协的方式谋求危机的解决。对他而言，军事部署乃是向苏联和古巴施加压力、促其妥协的重要手段，是实现政治目标的重要工具。肯尼迪政府对古巴的应急作战计划清晰地折射出美国对古巴政策的复杂性以及冷战的一些基本特征，也揭示出美国霸权的限度。
    注释：
    ①James Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse, New York: Pantheon Books, 1993, pp. 141, 160-161, 289-290; Bruce Allyn, James Blight and David Welch, eds., Back to the Brink, Lanham: University Press of America, 1992, p.9; James Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis, New York: Hill & Wang, 1989, pp. 249-250.
    ②Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989, pp. 6, 9, 50; Allyn, Blight and Welch, “Essence of Revision; Moscow, Havana and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security, vol. 14, no. 3, 1989/1990, pp. 146-147; Michael C. Desch, “‘That Deep Mud in Cuba’: The Strategic Threat and U. S. Planning for a Conventional Response during the Missile Crisis,” Security Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, 1991, p.332; Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000, p.189.
    ③James Hershberg, “Before ‘the Missiles of October’: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike against Cuba?” Diplomatic History, vol. 14, no. 2, 1990.
    ④Wayne S. Smith, ed., The Russians Aren‘t Coming: New Soviet Policy in Latin America, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992, p.163; James Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, p.151.
    ⑤Herbert Parmet, J FK: The Presidency of John F. Kennedy, New York: Penguin Books, 1986, pp. 46-47; Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure: Kennedy, Eisenhower, and the CIA at the Bay of Pigs, New York: Norton, 1987, pp. 58-59.
    ⑥Mike Mansfield, “The Cuban Aftermath,” 1 May 1961, Digital National Security Archive（DNSA），Cuba, no. 67; Arthur M. Schlesinger, J r., Robert Kennedy and His Times, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978, p.473.
    ⑦Foreign Relations of the United States（FRUS）， 1961-1963, vol. 10, Washington, D. C.: US Government Printing Office, 1997, pp. 302-304.
    ⑧Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, pp. 330-331; Thomas Paterson, ed., Kennedy’s Quest for Victory, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p.123; Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession, Washington, D. C.: Potomac Books, 2005, p.92.
    ⑨Rostow, “Notes on Cuba Policy,” April 24 1961, DNSA/Cuba, no. 53.
    ⑩FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 10, pp. 422, 459-460; Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, ed., The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, New York: The New Press, 1998, p.4.
    （11）FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 10, pp. 605-606.
    （12）FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 10, pp. 476-479, 481-483.
    （13）FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 10, p.688.
    （14）Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy‘s Wars, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 157; James Hershberg, “Before ’the Missiles of October, “ pp. 195-196.
    （15）FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 10, pp. 306-307; Weapon Systems Evaluation Group, “Historical Analysis of Command and Control Actions in the 1962 Cuban Crisis,” 14 August 1964, DNSA/CU1440, p.45.
    （16）FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 10, pp. 57-58.
    （17）FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 10, pp. 371-383; Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff. “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Military Responses to the Threat of Castro‘s Cuba,” April 1981, p.10.
    （18）FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 10, pp. 405-436.
    （19）US Army, “U. S. Army in the Cuban Crisis,” January 1963, DNSA/Cuba, no. 2819, p.1; Weapon Systems Evaluation Group, “Historical Analysis of Command and Control Actions in the 1962 Cuban Crisis,” pp. 46-47.
    （20）FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 10, pp. 423, 516-517.
    （21）Historical Division/Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Military Responses to the Threat of Castro’s Cuba,” p.11.
    （22）Weapon Systems Evaluation Group, “Historical Analysis of Command and Control Actions in the 1962 Cuban Crisis,” pp. 49, 51; FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. 10, pp. 638-639.