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[28] 随后杰弗逊进一步掌控了国会。失势的联邦党人开始押宝在司法系统。在政治斗争中失败的联邦党人退居司法领域，继续与杰弗逊党人进行斗争。1801年1月20日，亚当斯任命原国务卿马歇尔为最高法院首席大法官。2月4日， 马歇尔宣誓就职，但仍然继续履行国务卿职责。2月13日，联邦党人国会通过1801年司法法案，创设了16个新的中间法院的职位。亚当斯随即任命了这些法官。继而，马伯里被亚当斯任命为华盛顿特区的治安法官，并在亚当斯离任前为参议院所确认。但马伯里从未就任。亚当斯签署的委任状并非寄出。麦迪逊担任国务卿之后，不愿发出该委任状。因此在杰弗逊开始就任总统之后，马伯里将案子起诉到最高法院，要求麦迪逊签发委任状。这就是有名的马伯里诉麦迪逊案，Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. （1 Cranch） 137 （1803）。 [29] See Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers, Harvard University Press, 2005, P3-6. [30] See The Federalists, E. Earle ed., The Modern Library, 1937, P52-62. [31] See R. Matthews, The Radical Politics of Thomas Jefferson: A Revisionist View 125（1984）； Thomas Jefferson, Letter to William S. Smith（November 13, 1787）， in The Papers of Thomas Jefferson, J. Boyd ed., 1955, P355-57; Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Madison（Septermber 6, 1789）， in the Portable Thomas Jefferson, M. Peterson ed., 1975, P444-51. [32] See Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution, Yale University Press, 1992, P7. [33] See Paul Kahn, The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America, Yale Universtity Press, 1997. [34] See James Banner, To the Hartford Convention, Knopf, 1970. [35] 关于联邦党人分离运动的详细论述，请参见拙作，The Northern Confederacy, 未刊稿 [36] 这也是美国宪政史上一直争论不休的问题。最近的一个体现是United States v. Lopez , 514. U.S. 549（1995）。关于这一问题详细论述参见Daniel Farber, Lincon‘s Constitution, University of Chicago Press, 2003, P26-44. [37] See The Ordinance of South Carolina, in Edward Powrell, Nullification and Secession in the United States, University of Michigan Library, 2009, 287. [38] See Abraham Lincoln, The Gettysburg Address, at http://www.nps.gov/archive/gett/gettncem/gncaddress.htm 最后访问时间2010年1月27日。 [39] See Akhil Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography, Knopf, 2005, P364-380. [40] See Bruce Ackerman, “Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law,” 99 Yale L.J.503（1989）。 [41] See Donald Livingston, “The Very Idea of Secession”, Vol.35 No.5,Society, （1998）， P38-48. [42] See George Fletcher, Our Secret Constitution, Oxford University Press, 2003. [43] In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 （1895）。 [44] See Owen Fiss, Troubled Beginnings of the Modern State 1888-1910, Cambridge University Press, 2006, P53. [45] See Richard Epstein, “A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, “ 92 Yale. L.J. P1357-1408（1983） [46] See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations, Harvard University Press, 1995, P279-312. [47] See Cass Sunstein, The Second Bill of Rights: FDR‘s Unfinished Revolution, Basic Books, 2006. [48] Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 （1954）。 [49] See Gerald Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can the Court Bring About Social Change?, University of Chicago Press, 1991. [50] See Risa Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights, Harvard University Press, 2008. [51] See Bruce Ackerman, “The Living Constitution”, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 （2007）， P1757-1792. [52] See Bruce Ackerman, “The Living Constitution”, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 1737 （2007）， P1807. [53] See Akhil Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography, Knopf, 2005, [54] 这体现在popular constitutionalism学派中。See Larry Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, Oxford Universtity Press, 2004 [55] See e.g., Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations, Belknap Press,1993. [56] See William Connolly, Appearance and Reality in Politics, CUP Achive, 1981. [57] See Paul Kahn, The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America, Yale Universtity Press, 1997, P10. [58] See Paul Kahn, The Reign of Law: Marbury v. Madison and the Construction of America, Yale Universtity Press, 1997, P49-74; Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, Penguin Books, 1977. [59] See Paul Kahn, Putting Liberalism in its Place, Princeton University Press, 2008, P265: “The revolutionary breach is the paradigmatic political act, successfully creating a new identity by identifying an enemy. It breaks the bonds of authority by which the polity is subordinate to a political power that is now conceived as external to the poeple themselves, regardless of whether that power is actually a foreign state.” [60] See Paul Kahn, Putting Liberalism in its Place, Princeton University Press, 2008, P266: “A civil war may appear to an outsider as a contest between factions, but from within the nation-state, it will appear as a contest over the locus of the popular sovereign-that is, each side will purport not just to represent but to be the People”. [61] See Anthony Kronman, The Lost Lawyer, Harvard University Press, 1995, P53-108. [62] Alexis Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Mansfield and Winthrop trans., The University of Chicago Press, 2000, P55. [63] See Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution, Yale University Press, 1992, P30: “The American revolutionaries “also established models of legitimate revolutionary activity that shaped the theory and practice of subsequent generations, for better or for worse.” [64] See Bruce Ackerman, The Future of Liberal Revolution, Yale University Press, 1992, P14: “The lower lawmaking track is intended to register the successful conclusions of pluralist democratic politics-the mix of interest group pressure, regular electioneering, and practical policymaking that characterizes the democratic polity most of the time. The higher lawmaking track, in contrast, is designed with would-be revolutionaries in mind.”. [65] See Jon Elster,Ulysses Unbound, Cambridge University Press, 2000; Stephen Holmes, “Precommitment and the Paradox of Democracy”, in Passions and Restraints, University of Chicago Press, 1995, P134-177. [66] See Paul Kahn, Legitimacy and History: Self-Government in American Constitutional Theory, Yale University Press, 1992. |